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Many people rely on online social networks as sources of news and information, and the spread of
media content with ideologies across the political spectrum influences online discussions and impacts
actions offline. To examine the impact of media in online social networks, we generalize bounded-
confidence models of opinion dynamics by incorporating media accounts as influencers in a network.
We quantify partisanship of content with a continuous parameter on an interval, and we formulate
higher-dimensional generalizations to incorporate content quality and increasingly nuanced political
positions. We simulate our model with one and two ideological dimensions, and we use the results of
our simulations to quantify the “entrainment” of content from non-media accounts to the ideologies
of media accounts in a network. We maximize media impact in a social network by tuning the
number of media accounts that promote the content and the number of followers of the accounts.
Using numerical computations, we find that the entrainment of the ideology of content spread by
non-media accounts to media ideology depends on a network’s structural features, including its size,
the mean number of followers of its nodes, and the receptiveness of its nodes to different opinions.
We then introduce content quality — a key novel contribution of our work — into our model. We
incorporate multiple media sources with ideological biases and quality-level estimates that we draw
from real media sources and demonstrate that our model can produce distinct communities (“echo
chambers”) that are polarized in both ideology and quality. Our model provides a step toward
understanding content quality and ideology in spreading dynamics, with ramifications for how to
mitigate the spread of undesired content and promote the spread of desired content.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social media (such as Twitter, Facebook, In-
stagram, and others) have become extremely influential
sources of news in daily life. For example, over two thirds
of American adults who participated in a recent survey
responded that social media, and their associated net-
works, is their primary source for obtaining news [1].
Given this large audience and the ease of sharing content
online, the content that spreads on online social networks
can have important consequences on public opinion, pol-
icy, and voting [2, 3].
The spread of content in a social network depends on
the response and biases of the individuals in that net-
work. Individual user preferences play a strong role in
the choice to consume news that conforms to (or even
enhances) previously held views [4]. One reason that pro-
paganda, misinformation, and disinformation has become
so widespread on social media networks is that users are
more likely to share a false or misleading story if it seems
to confirm or support their biases [5, 6]. Another chal-
lenge is that content is also spread and amplified through
bot, cyborg, and sockpuppet accounts [7].
The political biases of content and the accounts that
spread it goes beyond a naive separation of ‘liberal’ ver-
sus ‘conservative’, and the political spectrum of ideol-
ogy can include axes for social views (‘progressive’ versus
‘conservative’), economic views (‘socialist’ versus ‘capi-
talist’), views on government involvement (‘libertarian’
versus ‘authoritarian’), and others. Opinions can also be
issue-dependent. In a large body of research, Poole and
Rosenthal [8, 9] developed methods to classify ideological
positions in roll-call voting in the United States Congress
in ideological space, and they found that two dimensions
is typically sufficient to capture an overwhelming major-
ity of the variance of ideologies. Their work laid the foun-
dation of the Voteview project [10], which characterizes
the ideologies of legislators in the United States Congress
based on their voting records. Multidimensional polit-
ical ideologies have also been explored in the context
of the United States Supreme Court. For example, by
examining singular value decompositions, Sirovich [11]
demonstrated that decisions by the judges in the second
Rehnquist Court are well-described by a two-dimensional
subspace. This has typically also been true of voting on
legislation in the United States Congress [12].
Political biases are not the only way in which people
judge the news that they consume and share on social
media. As the prevalence of misinformation, disinforma-
tion, and “fake news” becomes increasingly prominent
in everyday life and the global conversations of talking
heads, social-media users are also considering the quality
of news content. For example, in the aforementioned Pew
Research Study [1], the majority of respondents acknowl-
edged that the news that they see, consume, and spread
on social-media platforms may be inaccurate. There is
evidence that poor-quality content travels deeper, more
broadly, and faster than high-quality content (such as
fact-based reporting) [13]. The same study concluded
that these differences in spreading patterns are primarily
the result of human judgement, rather than arising from
accounts such as bots.
A large body of work has studied the spread of content
on social media [13, 14]. One approach is to mathemat-
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2ically model the spread of content on social media using
ordinary differential equations, where the equations can
capture changes in time of the proportion of a population
that is “susceptible to”, “exposed to”, “infected with”,
or “immune to” the propagation of such content (e.g.,
a rumor) [15–18]. Such compartmental models have the
advantage of being analytically tractable, but they do
not capture the effects of either network structure or
heterogeneity in account characteristics. Other studies
have focused instead on data-driven or computational ap-
proaches [4, 5, 13, 19]. One important research direction
in this vein is quantifying the existence of distinct com-
munities and “echo chambers” [20–23] on social media,
wherein individuals interact primarily with other like-
minded individuals. Some recent work on modeling the
spread of content has tried to bridge the gap between
these two approaches by introducing mathematical mod-
els that capture network features of social media [24, 25],
including some very recent mechanistic models of radi-
calization dynamics [26] and filter bubbles [27]. Our ap-
proach in the present paper has some similarities with
those in Prasetya and Murata [28], who generalized an
independent-cascade model to explore the effects of se-
lective exposure and connection strength on news prop-
agation, and Martins [29], who developed a continuous-
opinion, discrete-action model to explore the emergence
of extremism. Extremism in models of opinion dynamics
was also studied recently in the context of radicalization
and terrorism [30].
In the present paper, we formulate and study a model
for the influence of media accounts on the ideology and
quality of content that is shared in a social network.
First, we develop a general content-spreading model with
an n-dimensional continuous ideology space and spread-
ing choices based on a bounded-confidence mechanism
[31–33]. We also model how to include media accounts
as influencer nodes in a network. This has been con-
sidered in other recent work, such as in the context of
voters models with discrete-valued opinions [34, 35]. In
our work, we conduct extensive numerical simulations
to examine the impact of media accounts on content in
examples with one and two ideological dimensions. We
then introduce content quality into our model; this is
a key novel feature of our work. Using the resulting en-
hanced model, we employ numerical simulations to exam-
ine the effect of multiple media sources on the “entrain-
ment” (with one possible uncharitable interpretation as
“brainwashing”) of non-media nodes in the network by
media nodes. As a parallel to our consideration of me-
dia nodes, radical or charismatic leaders have also been
introduced into voter models [36, 37], DeGroot models
[38], and bounded-confidence models [39].
Our work advances the study of online content spread-
ing in several ways. In our model, we propose a measure
of media impact; this allows us to quantify the influ-
ence that a set of media accounts has on the ideology
of content in a social network at consensus. Our model
has the advantageous feature of supporting a multidimen-
sional continuous ideology space for content, although we
are not the first to employ a multidimensional opinion
space. See [40] for a discussion of consensus in bounded-
confidence models in Rd and [41] for some results on the
convergence and stability of such models. For wider-
ranging discussions of consensus dynamics and opinion
models, we see [31, 42]. A key novelty of our work is the
introduction of content quality into the spreading dynam-
ics; to our knowledge, our model is the first to explore the
effects of content quality on spreading. This is an impor-
tant advancement for two reasons: (1) the quality of news
content has a major effect on its spreading dynamics,
and it is therefore important to study it from a dynami-
cal perspective; and (2) the spread of poor-quality news
content is a major social problem. Investigations into
such problems — especially ones that produce potential
mechanistic insights into them — have the potential to
help motivate strategies for mitigating their effects.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Sec. II, which gives
a concise overview of our work, we give a non-technical
sketch of our model and briefly outline our key results.
In Sec. III, we develop our bounded-confidence model
with content spreading. We describe a network structure
that incorporates both non-media and media accounts in
Sec. III A, and we introduce our dynamic content updat-
ing rule in Sec. III B. In Sec. IV, we examine the dynamics
of our model with one ideological dimension for content.
We describe how we simulate the model in Sec. IV A, and
we quantify media impact for different parameter values
and network architectures in Sec. IV B. We present a gen-
eralization of our model to two ideological dimensions for
content in Sec. V. In Sec. VI, we develop our model fur-
ther to incorporate a notion of media quality into the
content updating rule. In Sec. VII, we show simulations
and results of media impact with the incorporation of
content quality, including an example in which we draw
media biases and qualities from a public hand-curated
distribution. We conclude and discuss several possible
extensions of our work in Sec. VIII.
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR MODEL AND
RESULTS
The aim of our paper is to advance understanding of
the spread of misinformation and “fake news” on social
media through mathematical modeling. This contrasts
with the more common data-driven, computational ap-
proach to these problems that tend to use existing models
(such as compartmental models). An important facet of
our approach is that the underlying spreading mecha-
nisms are based on continuous, multidimensional quanti-
ties — specifically, ideology and quality of content — that
result in discrete actions (spreading a message). By in-
corporating these continuous, multidimensional variables
into the spreading dynamics, our model (1) provides a
plausible framework to study the spread of extremism on
networks and (2) and lays the foundation for systematic
3comparison with empirical data of the spread of ideolo-
gies online.
Our model takes the form of a dynamical process on
a network. It includes (1) a time-independent network
structure of accounts and relationships between them in
an online social network (see Sec. III A) and (2) a mech-
anism for the temporal evolution of the ideology of the
content that is produced by media accounts in that net-
work (see Sec. III B). To represent the network structure,
we construct a graph in which nodes represent accounts
and edges represent followership relationships between
these accounts. One can either construct these networks
from empirical data (such as Facebook or Twitter net-
works) or using synthetic networks (e.g., from generative
models of random graphs). In a network, we designate
each account as either a media account or a non-media
account. Media accounts are accounts that do not fol-
low any other accounts but are followed by at least one
other account. In our model, we construe media accounts
as “influencers”, “opinion sources”, or “external opinion
forcing” in a network. It is for simplicity that we as-
sume that their content is not influenced by any other
accounts. All other accounts in a network are non-media
accounts, which each follow at least one other account in
the network.
We represent content that spreads in an online social
network based on its ideology (see Sec. VII) and even-
tually also on its quality (see Sec. VI). We suppose that
accounts in a network spread content during each dis-
crete time step. We determine the ideology of the con-
tent that is spread by an account at each time step with
a simple update rule. A helpful way to conceptualize the
update rule is as follows. At each time step, each account
“reads” the content from all of the accounts that it fol-
lows, and it is influenced only by accounts whose content
is sufficiently similar to the ideology of its own content.
In the next time step, the account spreads new content
in which the new ideology is a mean of its old ideology
and the aforementioned sufficiently similar ideologies of
the accounts that it reads. As a real-life example, a user
may read several articles on a topic and then create a
message (e.g., a tweet) based on these articles that has
their own “spin” on the material. We give a precise def-
inition of the update rule in Sec. III B.
An important question that we are able to study with
our model is how much the ideology of the media ac-
count(s) in a network entrains the content that is spread
by non-media accounts in that network. That is, how
strong does the external forcing by media need to be to
have a concrete impact on the outcome of the ideological
dynamics? To quantify the amount of media influence,
we calculate a summary statistic that we call media im-
pact. Using numerical simulations of our model, we illus-
trate how the number of media accounts and the number
of followers per media account affect the media impact.
Surprisingly, we find that the most successful media en-
trainment occurs when there are a moderate number of
media accounts, each of which has a moderate number of
followers. We study how network parameters (such as the
number of non-media accounts) affect this phenomenon
in Sec. IV and Sec. V.
An exciting outcome of our modeling and analysis is
that “echo chambers” arise naturally from our content-
spreading mechanism. Following common usage in socio-
logical research (see, e.g., [20] and [21]), we use the phrase
“echo chambers” to refer to groups of non-media nodes
who primarily or solely influence only each other’s ideolo-
gies and are not influenced much by those accounts that
are outside the group. These ideological echo chambers
emerge even when there are many followership connec-
tions between accounts in the different ideological echo
chambers. (In our model, the follower relationships do
not change, although it would be fascinating to study a
generalization of our model in the form of a coevolving
network.) In Sec. VII, we use a hand-curated distribu-
tion of ideologies and qualities of real-world media outlets
as an input to our model. We observe the emergence of
two polarized communities: one with high-quality, ide-
ologically moderate content and one with conservative,
low-quality content. Our model is very flexible, as it
allows many generalizations and modifications to study
features of interest in online social networks. For exam-
ple, one can study the influence of multiple social-media
platforms by generalizing our networks to multilayer net-
works, and one can also draw media content and ideology
from different probability distributions. It is also possible
to adapt our model to study other applications in which
one combines continuous parameters (for ideology, qual-
ity, self-confidence, or something else) with discrete ac-
tions based on those parameters. A few examples include
models for gambling in sports, choices among competing
products, and choices of students of majors and courses
to take at a university.
III. A BOUNDED-CONFIDENCE MODEL
WITH CONTENT SPREADING
A. Social network structure
Consider a social network with N non-media accounts.
We represent this social network with a graph G(VN , E),
where each nodes in the set VN represent an account and
each edge in the set E represents a follower relationship
from one account to another. Specifically, we say that ac-
count i is a follower of account j if there is a directed edge
from j to i. With this structure, we can represent this
social network as an adjacency matrix A, where Aij = 1
if account i follows account j and Aij = 0 otherwise. We
do not assume reciprocal follower relationships, so A is
not symmetric in general. We also assume that the net-
work structure is fixed, so follower relationships do not
change in time.
We now introduce media accounts into the above so-
cial network. Suppose that media accounts do not change
their ideology, as encapsulated in the content that they
4produce, so they are not influenced by other accounts.
Therefore, media accounts only have edges that are di-
rected outward (i.e., their in-degree is always 0). Of
course, this is a simplification of real-world media out-
lets, which may (in some cases) be swayed or affected by
individuals or by public opinion. We make this simpli-
fying assumption for two reasons: (1) we suppose that
the media ideology represents the ideology of a particu-
lar topic or news story (and such a view of a given media
outlet is unlikely to change much on the time scale of
online content spread of a story); and (2) it allows us to
examine the effect of an “external forcing” of ideological
content. Our assumption is analogous to the inclusion of
zealots, which have been studied in various opinion mod-
els, including voter models [36] and the Deffuant model
[43]. We let M denote the number of media accounts
and nM denote the number of followers (i.e., out-edges)
per media account. We assume that each media account
has the same number of followers, with one exception in
Sec. VII (where we impose a media follower-number dis-
tribution based on data from real-world media outlets).
Once we add media accounts, the total number of nodes
in a network is N +M .
We represent the ideology of each account in a network
at discrete time t by xti (where i ∈ {1, . . . , N +M}), and
we take the ideology space to be continuous and bounded,
such that x ∈ [−1, 1]d. We allow the ideology space to
be d-dimensional, so we can be more nuanced than the
typical choice in prior research of using d = 1 [44]. At
time t, each account spreads content (perhaps with their
own spin, as has been studied for memes using Facebook
data [45]) that reflects its current ideology xti.
B. Content updating rule
We update content synchronously at each discrete time
step in the following way. Accounts update their content
by averaging the ideologies of observed content that is
sufficiently close to their own opinion; we say that an
account is receptive to such content. Accounts include
their own ideology at the previous time step when de-
termining their location in ideological space in the next
step. During that step, they share content with that
ideology. Accounts see content only from accounts that
they follow; therefore, media accounts are not receptive
to any other content. We define a receptiveness parame-
ter c, which gives the distance in ideology within which
an account is receptive. With this notation, we define
the set of accounts to which account i is receptive to be
Ii = {j ∈ {1, . . . , N +M}|Aij = 1; dist(xj ,xi) < c}. We
also have to decide how to measure distance dist(y) in
ideological space. One can consider any metric, and we
choose to use the `p norm.
The updating mechanism for the ideology of an ac-
count is
xt+1i =
1
|Ii|+ 1
xti + ∑
j∈Ii
xtj
 , (1)
which we can also write as
xt+1i =
1
|Ii|+ 1
xti + N+M∑
j=1
Aijx
t
jf(x
t
j ,x
t
i)
 , (2)
where f(x) = 1 if dist(xj ,xi) < c and f(x) = 0 oth-
erwise. In Fig. 1, we show a schematic of this updat-
ing rule with a small, concrete example. Our model
builds on previous work in opinion dynamics. Our
consensus-forming mechanism from averaging ideology
is reminiscent of the influential work of DeGroot [46].
Although this is a standard choice, a recent paper by
Mei et al. [47] suggested that weighted-median influ-
ence is also a reasonable choice for consensus formation.
In the present paper, we draw our bounded-confidence
mechanism from the Hegselmann–Krause (HK) [33] and
Deffuant [32, 44] models of continuous opinion dynam-
ics. Bounded-confidence updates are also related to the
DeGroot–Friedkin (DF) model of social power [48].
IV. DYNAMICS WITH A ONE-DIMENSIONAL
IDEOLOGY
As an example, we examine content spreading when
our model has one ideological dimension, where we inter-
pret the value xi ∈ [−1, 1] as the political perspective of
the content of account i on a liberal–conservative axis.
We take x = −1 to be very liberal, x = 1 to be very con-
servative, and x = 0 to be moderate. We use the distance
dist(xj ,xi) = |xj − xi|. We then write the content up-
dating rule for these evolving pieces of one-dimensional
political content (see Eq. 2) by writing
f(xj , xi) =
{
1 , if |xj − xi| < c
0 , otherwise
. (3)
In this example, we suppose that there are M media ac-
counts that all have the same political opinion xM ∈
[−1, 1]. There are multiple possible interpretations of this
assumption. For example, one can interpret it as M dif-
ferent media outlets that share the same message, which
has a given political bias (as represented by a particular
location in ideological space). Another way to interpret
it is as one media account with M − 1 affiliated “sock-
puppet” accounts, which it is using to help spread its
message with the specified political bias.
A. Simulations
In each network, we suppose that there are N non-
media accounts, and we vary the number M of media
5(b)(a)
FIG. 1: A schematic of the ideology updating rule in
our model. In panel (a), we show the ideology of nodes
in a social network at time t. In panel (b), we show
their ideologies in the next time step (after we have
applied the updating rule). In this example, there are
M = 2 media nodes (gray circles) and N = 4 non-media
nodes. To make this example more concrete, let’s focus
on the yellow highlighted node. The yellow node follows
four other accounts, two of which are media accounts
and two of which are non-media accounts. If we take
the receptiveness parameter to be c = 0.5, the yellow
node is receptive only to content from three of these
accounts (specifically, the ones that are surrounded by
dashed boxes). After averaging the content from the
accounts to which it is receptive, the yellow account
updates its ideology for the next time step to be
xt+1 = 14 (0.7 + 0.5 + 0.9 + 0.9) = 0.75. During time
step t+ 1, this account shares content with that
ideology.
accounts and the number nM of followers of each media
account. We assume that all media accounts in a given
simulation have an equal number of followers, although
it would be interesting to extend our model by drawing
nM from a distribution of numbers of followers. Unless
we note otherwise, we use 200 trials for each numerical
experiment, and we interpret a trial to have “converged”
if |xti − xt−1i | < 10−4 for all i for ten consecutive steps.
For simplicity, we set the receptiveness parameter to take
the value c = 0.5, except for Fig. 8, where we examine
the effects of varying this parameter. For a detailed dis-
cussion on the effects of the receptiveness parameter in
bounded-confidence models, see [44].
We initialize the non-media accounts to have evenly-
distributed initial ideologies, so
x0 =
[
−1,−1 + 2
N − 1 , . . . , 1
]
.
We uniformly randomly permute the starting values of
non-media nodes for each trial, so they are not spatially
ordered in the network. In each trial, each media account
has nM distinct followers, which we choose uniformly at
random from the non-media accounts. We choose each
media account’s followers independently, so it is possi-
ble for a non-media account to follow multiple media ac-
counts.
In Fig. 2, we show examples of individual trials with
different numbers of media accounts and numbers of fol-
lowers per media account. We run our model on the Reed
College Facebook network from the Facebook100 data
set [49]. These networks are Facebook friendship net-
works on university campuses from one day in fall 2005.
In our simulations, we use only the largest connected
component of each university Facebook network to rep-
resent non-media accounts, and we note that the friend-
ship connections between non-media accounts in these
networks are bidirectional. In Fig. 2, we show the ideol-
ogy of each of the N = 962 non-media accounts on the
vertical axis and the simulation time t on the horizontal
axis. We take the media opinion to be xM = 0.9. These
trials suggest that media nodes influence both conver-
gence time and content-spreading dynamics. We explore
these ideas further in Sec. IV B.
B. Media influence with a one-dimensional opinion
space
Our simulations of our content-spreading model sug-
gest that the number of non-media accounts that con-
verge to the ideological position of the media nodes — as
we just illustrated for an example (see Fig. 2) in which
all media nodes have the same ideology — depends non-
trivially both on the number of media accounts and on
the number of followers per media account. In this sub-
section, we present simulations that illuminate the level
of media influence on a variety of real and synthetic net-
works. We continue to assume that all media nodes have
the same ideological position.
We introduce an order parameter that we use as a di-
agnostic to measure the impact of media nodes on the
ideological positions at convergence. Let xbi denote the
ideological position of account i at convergence in the ab-
sence of media influence. We establish a mean baseline
ideology R0 by computing the mean distance between the
ideological positions (xbi ) of non-media accounts at con-
vergence and the media ideology xM . In mathematical
terms, this baseline is
R0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖xbi − xM‖2 . (4)
The function R0 characterizes the mean effect on non-
media nodes, for one trial, of the dynamics for a given
network structure in the absence of media influence. Be-
cause the outcome depends on the initial ideological po-
sitions of the non-media accounts, we average R0 over
many trials.
Once we have calculated the baseline ideology R0, we
construct a similar order parameter RM that character-
izes the mean outcome of the dynamics for the same net-
work when we introduce media nodes. Let x∗i denote
6(a)
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FIG. 2: Individual trials of the Reed College Facebook
network (with N = 962 non-media nodes) with different
levels of media influence. We influence the convergence
time and content-spreading dynamics by varying the
media-account parameters M and nM . (a) With low
media influence, most accounts converge to the location
x = 0 in ideological space. (b) For larger values of M
and nM , a large fraction of the non-media accounts
converge to the ideological position of the media nodes.
(c) For still larger values of these parameters, splitting
in ideology occurs very rapidly, resulting in a smaller
fraction of non-media accounts that converge to the
media’s ideology. In the simulations of all three panels,
we evenly distribute the initial ideologies of non-media
accounts, and we set the ideological position of all
media accounts to xM = 0.9.
the ideological position of account i at convergence in
a network with media influence. The associated media-
influenced ideology diagnostic is
RM =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖x∗i − xM‖2 . (5)
The order parameters R0 and RM allow us to quan-
tify the impact of media nodes on content-spreading dy-
namics, where we note that one can also define time-
dependent analogs of (4) and (5). We define the media
impact for one trial to be the ratio of the mean baseline
ideological distance to the media-influenced ideological
distance in that trial:
R =
R0
RM
. (6)
We can also obtain an overall media impact
R =
R0
RM
(7)
by averaging the media-influenced opinion function RM
over some number (e.g., 200) of trials. We interpret the
media impact in the following way. If R = 1, the media
has not had an influence on the “average” (specifically,
the mean) ideological position of the non-media accounts
(and the content that they spread) at convergence. If
R ∈ [0, 1), the media nodes have driven the mean ideo-
logical position of the accounts to be farther away from
the media’s ideological position than is the case without
the media accounts. Finally, if R > 1, the mean ideologi-
cal position of the non-media accounts (and hence of the
content that they spread) is closer to the media ideology
than it would be without the introduction of the media
accounts, with larger values of R indicating a stronger
impact.
Equation (7) gives one of multiple possible summary
diagnostics to measure media influence. Another option
is to measure the mean of the distance without rescal-
ing. (That is, one can use only the expected value of R
from Eq. (5).) This alternative entails an impact level of
RM ∈ [0, 2], where small values of RM represent consid-
erable “entrainment” to the media ideology. That is, the
media nodes have successfully influenced (e.g., “brain-
washed”, to describe it in an uncharitable way) many
non-media accounts in the network. Large values of RM
represent low levels of media influence. Using this alter-
native impact function for the experiments in this section
gives the same qualitative results to what we report using
(7).
In Fig. 3, we illustrate media impact values for different
numbers of media accounts (M) and numbers of media
followers (nM ). In color, we show the mean value of the
summary diagnostic R over 50 trials. These simulations
suggest a surprising result: the highest levels of adoption
of media ideology do not occur for the largest values in
(nM ,M) parameter space. Instead, the most successful
scenario for promoting widespread adoption of the me-
dia ideology is to spread the content through a moderate
7FIG. 3: Media impact for the Reed College network
(N = 962) with different numbers of media accounts
(M) on the vertical axis and followers per media
account (nM ) on the horizontal axis. All media
accounts have the same ideological position of
xM = 0.9. The colors indicate the values of R, the mean
of the impact summary diagnostic [see Eq. (7)] for
distance from media ideology over 50 trials. Dark red
indicates the most media impact (i.e., the largest values
of R), and white indicates the least. The media nodes’
ideological position xM and the initial ideological
positions of the non-media accounts are the same as in
Fig. 2. The arrows designate the regions of the plot
that correspond to the mean media impact for each of
the three panels in Fig. 2.
number of media accounts, each of which has a moder-
ate number of followers. This observation is consistent
with previous empirical observations that accounts with
a small number of followers can significantly promote the
spreading of content on Twitter [50]. For a very small
number of media nodes (or if the media nodes have very
few followers), as in Fig. 2a, the media ideology has very
low impact. A large number of media nodes with many
followers per account (as in Fig. 2c) produces some im-
pact, yielding values of R in the interval (1, 2). However,
we observe a larger impact when there are a moderate
number of media accounts that each have a moderate
number of followers (see Fig. 2b). In this situation, we
often obtain R ≥ 2.
In Fig. 4, we show heat maps of the media entrainment
values (using the summary diagnostic R) for our model
for social networks from the Facebook100 data set [49].
These networks consists of people at a particular univer-
sity who are connected to each other via Facebook friend-
ships (which yield bidirectional edges) from one day in
fall 2005. We add media accounts to each network in the
way that we described previously for the Reed network
in Sec. IV A. For each of the Facebook100 networks
that we examine, our simulations produce a distinct re-
gion with large media impact (specifically, with R ≥ 2).
In each case, the largest amount of media impact does
not occur for the largest values of the two quantities in
(nM ,M) parameter space.
In Fig. 5, we show heat maps of the media entrainment
values (using the summary diagnostic R) for our model
for a variety of synthetic network architectures, each of
which has 100 non-media accounts. For clarity, we first
briefly describe how we construct each of these networks.
These networks are a directed ring lattice, a star, a di-
rected variant of Erdo˝s–Re´nyi (ER) networks, a directed
variant of Watts–Strogatz (WS) networks, and complete
networks. In the star network, all but one of the non-
media accounts follow one central non-media account.
These edges are bidirectional, so the central non-media
account follows all of the other non-media accounts. We
construct a directed ring lattice as follows. Each non-
media account follows k other non-media accounts, where
the ith node follows nodes {i+1, i+2, . . . , i+k} (mod N).
In this case, the edges are not bidirectional (so, for ex-
ample, account 1 follows account 2, but account 2 does
not follow 1). We construct a directed variant of a WS
network by starting with this directed ring lattice and
rewiring each edge with probability β = 0.5 [51]. We
rewire a directed edge from node i to node j by selecting
a new node j′ uniformly at random from the nodes that
account i does not currently follow; we remove the edge
from i to j and add an edge from i to j′. We construct
directed ER networks, which have an expected mean out-
degree of k = 25, as a variant of the G(N, p) model. (In
other words, the expected mean number of non-media
accounts that a node follows is k = 25.) For the directed
ER and WS networks, we construct a new network for
each trial, so one should interpret our simulation results
as a sample mean over many networks. Although all net-
works have the same number of non-media accounts, the
region of parameter space in which the media has the
most impact differs across different networks. This sug-
gests that network architecture plays an important role
in determining the level of media involvement that is nec-
essary for media accounts to exert “global” influence in
a network.
We now examine the media impact as we vary k, the
mean number of non-media accounts that a non-media
account follows, on similar network architectures. In
Fig. 6, we show heat maps of the media impact summary
diagnostic R for directed ER networks with different ex-
pected mean out-degrees. As we increase the expected
mean out-degree k, we observe that media impact also
increases.
We now perform numerical experiments in which we
vary the size of the directed ER networks by varying the
number of non-media accounts. To try to isolate the ef-
fect of network size, we fix the ratio of the expected mean
number (k) of non-media accounts that are followed to
the total number of non-media accounts (N) for each sim-
ulation. As in our earlier observations, we see in Fig. 7
that the media impact increases as we increase the num-
ber N of non-media nodes. However, in this case, we ob-
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FIG. 4: Heat maps of the summary diagnostic R for media impact in the Facebook networks of various universities
from the Facebook100 data set [49] illustrate that the largest media impact occurs for moderate numbers of media
accounts with moderate numbers of followers. In each panel, the vertical axis gives the number of media accounts
(M), the horizontal axis gives the number of followers per media account (nM ), and the colors indicate the mean
impact summary diagnostic (R) over 50 trials. Dark red indicates the most media impact (i.e., the largest values of
R), and white indicates the least.
serve a progressively larger spread in the media entrain-
ment diagnostic R for progressively larger N . For exam-
ple, for N = 1000 and k = 250, the spread of the media
impact (which we define to be
(
max{R} −min{R}) over
all (nM ,M) pairs) is approximately 88.2048 − 0.9980 =
87.2068. However, for N = 50 and k = 13, the spread
is approximately 1.4295− 1.0364 = 0.3931 in our simula-
tions.
In Fig. 8, we illustrate the effect of varying the recep-
tiveness parameter c. If the receptiveness is very small,
non-media accounts in a network adjust their ideological
positions only if the content that they see is very close
to their current ideology. Consequently, we observe little
or no media impact on the ideological positions of the
non-media nodes in the network. For sufficiently large
receptiveness, however, the media do impact the mean
ideological position of non-media nodes, with a larger
impact for larger values of c.
One natural generalization of our model is to consider
the effect of varying the weighting of an individual’s cur-
rent ideology in its content updating rule. (This is remi-
niscent of self-appraisal in DeGroot models [31, 48].) One
way to incorporate such a weighting, such as an account
valuing its current ideology more than those of the ac-
counts that it follows, is to include a parameter w ∈ N
into the update rule in Eq. 2). The new content updating
rule with self-weight w is
xt+1i =
1
|Ii|+ w
wxti + N+M∑
j=1
Aijx
t
jf(x
t
j ,x
t
i)
 . (8)
We perform numerical experiments on directed ER net-
works in which we increase the self-weight w such that
non-media nodes weight their current ideology 3, 5, and
10 times more than the ideologies of the accounts that
they follow. We show the results of these simulations in
Fig. 9. In these examples, we observe media impact that
is qualitatively similar to our observations without the
parameter w.
As suggested by the individual trials in Fig. 2, there
is a relationship between media impact and time to con-
vergence. As we illustrate in Fig. 10, our simulations
indicate that larger media impact is positively correlated
with longer time to convergence.
C. Metastability and long-time dynamics
In Sec. IV B, we defined a numerical simulation to have
“converged” if |xti−xt−1i | < TOL = 10−4 for all i. Given
this definition, an important question to ask is whether
(1) these “converged” values have truly reached a sta-
tionary state or (2) our model will subsequently reach a
consensus state on extremely long time scales. To ex-
amine this question, we run numerical simulations of our
9(a) Star network. (b) Directed ring lattice with k = 25. (c) Watts–Strogatz network with
k = 25 and β = 0.5.
(d) Directed Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network
with k = 25.
(e) Complete network.
FIG. 5: Heat maps of the summary diagnostic R for media impact of various synthetic networks illustrate that the
largest media impact occurs for moderate numbers of media accounts with moderate numbers of followers for a
variety of network architectures. In the directed ring lattice, each non-media account follows k = 25 neighboring
non-media accounts. We construct a directed variant of a Watts–Strogatz network from the directed ring lattice
with k = 25. In it, we rewire follower connections with a probability of β = 0.5. In the directed variant of an
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network, we take the expected mean out-degree (i.e., the mean number of non-media accounts that are
followed) to be k = 25. In the star network, all non-media accounts follow one central non-media account, which also
follows the peripheral non-media accounts. In each panel, the vertical axis gives the number of media accounts (M),
the horizontal axis gives the number of followers per media account (nM ), and the colors indicate the media impact
diagnostic (R), which we compute as a mean over 200 trials. Dark red indicates the most media impact (i.e., the
largest values of R), and white indicates the least. For the directed ER and WS networks, we construct a new
network for each of the 200 trials.
model with a convergence tolerance of TOL = 0 and im-
pose a bailout time of T = 250, 000 time steps. If our
simulations reach the bailout time, we record the “con-
verged” state as the state at the bailout time. We per-
form these simulations on the Reed College Facebook net-
work with the same parameter values (N = 962, c = 0.5,
and xM = 0.9) as in Fig. 3 and on directed ER net-
works with the same parameter values (N = 100, k = 25,
c = 0.5, and xM = 0.9) as in Fig. 5.
Although the apparent “convergence” of our simula-
tions does exhibit interesting dynamics at multiple time
scales in some trials (see Fig. 13), these cases are rare.
The distributions for the mean have the same form re-
gardless of whether we choose TOL = 10−4 or TOL = 0.
The same is true for the distributions of the variance. In
Figs. 14 and 15, we show histograms of the mean ideol-
ogy and variance of the ideology over 500 trials in the
Reed College Facebook network (see Fig. 14) and in di-
rected ER networks (see Fig. 15). Both figures illustrate
that the qualitative dynamics are same for both toler-
ance levels. In yellow, we show the distributions with-
out media impact (M = 0 and nM = 0); in orange, we
show the distributions when there are a moderate num-
ber of media accounts with a moderate number of fol-
lowers; in blue, we show the distributions when there are
large number of media accounts that each have a large
number of followers. As in our simulations in Sec. IV B,
the mean ideologies are higher in the presence of media
nodes; and perfect entrainment (for which the mean ide-
ology is 0.9) occurs primarily when there are a moderate
number of media accounts (e.g., M = 15 for the ER net-
works), rather than when there are a larger number of
media accounts (e.g., M = 30 for the ER networks). We
supplement these observations by examining the distri-
butions of the variance in ideology. Small variance in
ideology corresponds to consensus states, and we observe
these states only when media influence is absent (e.g.,
M = 0) or low or moderate (e.g., M = 15 for the ER
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FIG. 6: Heat maps of the media impact diagnostic R for directed ER networks with different values of the expected
mean number k of non-media accounts that non-media accounts follow. Our simulations suggest that media impact
is larger for progressively larger k. The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M), the horizontal axis is the
number of followers per media account (nM ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we
average over 200 trials. Dark red indicates the most media impact (i.e., the largest values of R), and white indicates
the least.
networks). In other words, high levels of media influence
(e.g., M = 30 for the ER networks) do not result in ide-
ological consensus (including as a result of entrainment
to the media ideology), even at 0 tolerance.
In the present paper, we focus on dynamics on short
and medium time scales, as we believe that it is particu-
larly relevant to simulate the dynamics of content spread
over the course of a news cycle. However, the observed
separation of time scales in some trials of our numerical
experiments may have interesting implications for future
studies on long-term effects of media impact in online
social networks.
V. EXTENDING OUR MODEL TO TWO
IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
We now move beyond the discussion of one ideologi-
cal dimension and examine our content-spreading model
with two ideological dimensions. Suppose that, at time t,
each account has an ideological position of xi ∈ [−1, 1]×
[−1, 1]. We use the `2 norm to calculate the distance
dist(xj ,xi) = ‖xj − xi‖2 in ideology between accounts i
and j. Depending on context, this two-dimensional ide-
ology may represent two different aspects of a political-
bias spectrum (e.g., the first dimension may represent
socially liberal versus socially conservative, whereas the
second may represent preferred economic policies that
very between socialism and capitalism); or it may rep-
resent political bias on multiple issues (e.g., immigration
reform and gun control). Given our ideological space and
choice of metric on this space, we then write our model
as in Eq. (2).
A. Simulations
We simulate our content-spreading model with two ide-
ological dimensions using a straightforward generaliza-
tion of the simulations of our model with one ideological
dimension. We add media accounts with a given ideology
xM and assign their followers uniformly at random from
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(a) N = 50 and k = 13 (b) N = 100 and k = 25
(c) N = 500 and k = 125 (d) N = 1000 and k = 250
FIG. 7: Heat maps of the media impact diagnostic R for directed ER networks with different numbers of non-media
accounts (N) for a fixed ratio (k/N) of the expected mean number of non-media accounts that non-media accounts
follow to the total number of non-media accounts. Our simulations suggest that both media impact R and the
spread of the media impact (which we define to be
(
max{R} −min{R}) over all (nM ,M) pairs) increase with N .
The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M), the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media
account (nM ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we average over 200 trials. Dark red
indicates the most media impact (i.e., the largest values of R), and white indicates the least. Unlike in our other
figures, we have not scaled the color range to be the same across these four figures; this aids in visualizing the
difference in the spread of impact values for networks of different sizes.
the non-media accounts. In our examples, we initialize
non-media accounts with ideological positions that we
draw uniformly at random for each trial. (Therefore, it
is again true that there is no spatial ordering of ideology
in the network structure.)
In Fig. 11, we show a heat map of simulations of media
impact in our model with two ideological dimensions. We
observe qualitatively similar results as in our simulations
of our content-spreading model with one-dimensional ide-
ologies. We again see that the largest media impact (i.e.,
entrainment) does not occur for the largest numbers of
media accounts and followers per media account. In-
stead, the largest amount of entrainment occurs when
there are a moderate number of media accounts, each of
which has a moderate number of followers.
VI. COMBINING MEDIA BIAS AND QUALITY
Thus far, we have used our content-spreading model
to study the effects of media ideology on content spread-
ing in social networks. We now introduce the primary
novel component of our work: incorporation of media
content quality into our spreading model. Bessi et al. [5]
observed that individuals are more likely to spread low-
quality content if it confirms or supports their existing
biases, and we seek to incorporate such behavior into our
content-spreading model.
We again denote the state of account i by xi. In our
prior discussions, this state was a vector in d-dimensional
ideological space (with d = 1 and d = 2 in our sim-
ulations). Now, however, we introduce an additional
dimension into an account’s current state to indicate
the quality of shared content; therefore, we now take
xi ∈ [−1, 1]d × [0, 1]. We allow content quality to lie on
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(a) c = 0.1 (b) c = 0.2 (c) c = 0.3
(d) c = 0.4 (e) c = 0.5
FIG. 8: Heat maps of the media impact diagnostic R for directed ER networks for different values of the
receptiveness parameter c. For small values of c, the receptiveness of accounts is too small for the media accounts to
impact the mean ideological positions of the non-media accounts. For progressively larger values of c, we observe
progressively larger media impact. The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M), the horizontal axis is the
number of followers per media account (nM ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we
average over 200 trials. Dark red indicates the most media impact (i.e., the largest values of R), and white indicates
the least.
(a) w = 3 (b) w = 5 (c) w = 10
FIG. 9: Heat maps of the media impact diagnostic R for directed ER networks for different values of the self-weight
w. In our numerical experiments, even when accounts weight their own ideology more heavily than those of the
accounts that they follow, we observe similar qualitative dynamics as when we do not incorporate the parameter w
into our model. The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M), the horizontal axis is the number of
followers per media account (nM ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we average over
200 trials. Dark red indicates the most media impact (i.e., the largest values of R), and white indicates the least.
a continuous spectrum, with values near xd+1,i = 0 rep-
resenting propaganda and disinformation (e.g., clickbait
or so-called “fake news”) and values closer to xd+1,i = 1
representing substantive, thorough, fact-based material.
To focus our discussion, suppose that there is one ide-
ological dimension, so d = 1 and xi = (x1,i, x2,i) ∈
[−1, 1] × [0, 1]. As before, suppose that accounts adjust
their ideological views only when they are exposed to
content that is within a distance c of their current ideol-
ogy (i.e., only when dist(x1,i, x1,j) ≤ c). Additionally, we
now suppose that accounts also consider content quality
when we determine their receptiveness. Account i de-
cides whether the content of account j is acceptable for
spreading based on the distance dist(x1,i, x1,j) between
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their ideological positions. If this distance is very small
(e.g., close to 0), this content supports account i’s ide-
ology, and i is more likely to spread it even if it is not
of high quality. However, if the distance in ideology is
larger (e.g., close to c), account i is more discerning and
tends to spread the content only when it is of sufficiently
high quality.
We quantify content discernment in the following way.
We calculate the minimum acceptable quality qi,j as a
linear function of distance in ideology between account i
and account j. That is,
qi,j =
1
c
dist(x1,i, x1,j) . (9)
With this functional form of qi,j , account i spreads con-
tent that confirms its bias exactly regardless of quality,
because the minimum acceptable quality is 0. If the con-
tent has an ideological position that equals the maximum
receptiveness distance c away from account i’s ideological
position, then account i spreads the content only if it is
of quality 1, the highest possible quality.
The ideological-position updating rule with quality dis-
cernment is
xt+11,i =
1
|Ii|+ 1
xt1,i + N+M∑
j=1
Aijx
t
1,jg(x
t
i,x
t
j)
 , (10)
where
g(xti,x
t
j) =
{
1 , if x2,j ≥ qi,j
0 , otherwise
(11)
and
Ii = {j ∈ {1, . . . , N +M}|Aij = 1; g(xi,xj) = 1} . (12)
We take the metric to be the `2 norm dist(xi, xj) =
‖x1,i − x1,j‖2, so we are using the same ideology met-
ric as in our previous discussions. When a non-media
node elects to spread content, we also adjust the quality
of the content that it spreads with the update
xt+12,i =
1
|Ii|+ 1
xt2,i + N+M∑
j=1
Aijx
t
2,jg(x
t
i,x
t
j)
 , (13)
which, along with Eq. (10), implies that
xt+1i =
1
|Ii|+ 1
xti + N+M∑
j=1
Aijx
t
jg(x
t
i,x
t
j)
 . (14)
VII. MEASURING IMPACT FROM MULTIPLE
SOURCES: MEDIA BIAS AND QUALITY
Earlier in our paper (see Sec. IV B), we studied the ef-
fect of the numbers of media accounts and media follow-
ers per media account when media content has one fixed
ideology. Our incorporation of content quality allows us
to examine an important question of societal interest in
a simple but plausible way: How do competing media
accounts influence the outcome of opinions or ideological
positions in a social network? This situation models a
more realistic scenario of the influence of disparate news
media (with heterogeneous political biases and content
quality) in a social network. We extend our media en-
trainment summary diagnostic from our model with one
ideological dimension to measure the impact of media ac-
counts on the mean ideological position at convergence
when there are multiple media sources. In this scenario,
the quantity of interest is a function R(x) that encodes
the impact of each possible ideological position x.
To construct the function R(x), we first establish a
baseline function r0(x) that encodes the prevalence of
each ideology for a given network in the absence of me-
dia accounts. Ideally, it make be desirable to take r0(x)
to be the probability that an account prefers content with
ideological position x. In practice, we construct a func-
tion r0(x) by binning the ideology of content for each
trial into bins of width δx; we then count the number
of times that there is content in the ideology interval
[x,x + δx], and we calculate a normalized histogram.
Once we have constructed the baseline function r0(x), we
use our previous strategy (see Sec. IV B) to construct a
function ri(x) that measures the prevalence of each ide-
ology for a network in the presence of media accounts.
That is, ri(x) is the distribution that describes the prob-
ability that a non-media account has ideological position
x when there are media accounts in the network. We
then use these functions to construct the media impact
function R(x) = ri(x) − rb(x). Positive values of R(x)
for ideology x indicate that the media has enhanced the
prevalence of content with this ideology in the network,
negative values indicate that the media has decreased the
prevalence of content with this ideology in the network,
and 0 indicates no change.
In our model, it is interesting to consider a variety
of distributions of media ideologies. For example, we can
draw these opinions from a convenient synthetic probabil-
ity distribution, or we can determine them from empirical
data. First, using one ideological dimension, we consider
two examples in which we draw media ideologies from
synthetic probability distributions. In Fig. 12, we show
the media impact functions when there are M = 100
media accounts with ideologies that we draw (1) from
a uniform distribution on [−1, 1] and (2) from a trun-
cated Gaussian distribution on [−1, 1] with mean 0 (be-
fore truncation) and standard deviation 0.5. For each of
these two examples, we examine the dependence of the
media impact functions on the number nM of followers
per media account.
We then showcase our model using a media distribu-
tion that we generate from hand-curated empirical ob-
servations of real-world media sources that incorporate
both political ideology (in one dimension) and content
quality (in the other dimension). This example includes
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M = 103 media accounts with ideological biases and
qualities from Version 4.0 of the hand-curated Ad Fontes
Media Bias Chart [52]. We rescale the ideology and qual-
ity chart coordinates so that they lie within the intervals
[−1, 1] and [0, 1], respectively. In Fig. 16, we show these
media content coordinates. These coordinates provide
an illustrative example of a possible input to our model;
one should not necessarily construe them as quantita-
tively representing the “true” ideologies of the depicted
sources. An important extension of our work is develop-
ing quantitative techniques (e.g., using sentiment analy-
sis) to analyze bias and quality of content sources from
real data. This is a difficult and interesting problem, and
we leave it as future work.
In Fig. 17, we show the temporal evolution of one trial
of our content-quality spreading model on the Reed Col-
lege network with media account ideologies and qualities
from the Media Bias Chart. We set each media account j
to have a number nM,j of followers that is proportional to
its number of followers on Twitter on 15 February 2019 at
17:36 Pacific Standard Time (under the constraint that
each media source in the model has at least one follower,
so we round up to one follower for some accounts). We
select followers for each media account by selecting the
non-media accounts whose initial conditions are closest in
ideological position to that of the media account. That is,
for each media account j (with j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}) and each
non-media account i (with i ∈ {1, . . . , N}), we calculate
the distance dist(x01,i, x1,Mj ) in ideological position for all
i at t = 0. From this set of all distances in ideological po-
sition from media account j, we select the nMj smallest
distances; these non-media accounts are the followers of
media account j. In the simulations for which we use this
media distribution as inputs, we observe the emergence
of two primary communities (“echo chambers”) of con-
tent: one in which the content is moderate ideologically
and of fairly high quality (specifically, it is about 0 in
ideology and about 0.75 in quality) and one in which the
opinion is more conservative but of lower quality (specifi-
cally, about 0.5 in ideology and about 0.4 in quality). The
polarization that results from simulations of our model is
a reflection of the polarization in the ideology and qual-
ity of the media account distribution. In our simulations,
the account for Fox News (which has an ideological po-
sition of 0.613636 and a quality of 0.3125 in the Media
Bias Chart and is followed by 28% of the non-media ac-
counts) is very popular and near the final location of the
conservative community in (ideology, quality) space.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We introduced a model for the spread of content in an
online social network, with both media and non-media
nodes, that accounts for the effects of both ideology and
content quality on the spreading dynamics. We based
the spreading dynamics of our model on a bounded-
confidence mechanism, such that accounts spread con-
tent that is sufficiently close to their current ideological
position, as reflected by the content that they shared in
the immediately previous time step. In the most sophis-
ticated version of our model, the quality of content deter-
mines how close an account’s ideological position should
be to the content’s ideological position for the account
to share it; therefore, low-quality content is shared only
when it supports an account’s existing ideological biases.
As far as we are aware, our model is the first mathemat-
ical model to explicitly incorporate the effects of media
quality on spreading dynamics. This is a key novelty of
our work.
We conducted simulations for our content-spreading
model for media content with both one and two ideo-
logical dimensions. Using results from our simulations,
we quantified the level of media “entrainment” (i.e., how
much the media affects the ideological positions of non-
media accounts) for a variety of network architectures.
We examined how the amount of media entrainment of
the non-media accounts in a network depends on the
numbers of media accounts and followers per media ac-
count for that network. We found that media impact
increases when one increases the number of non-media
accounts, the mean number of non-media connections,
or the receptiveness of non-media accounts. We also
observed a relationship between media entrainment and
convergence time in our model, with higher levels of me-
dia entrainment correlating positively with longer con-
vergence times. Finally, we simulated a version of our
model that accounts for content quality in the spread-
ing dynamics. Using a hand-curated set of media inputs
from real media outlets and their online followerships, we
demonstrated that this version of our model produces po-
larization in both ideology and quality of content. Specif-
ically, it yields a community of high-quality content in
the center of the political spectrum and a conservative
community of low-quality content. Our model provides a
useful step towards increasing understanding of how me-
dia content quality affects the spread of online content.
Our model is a simplistic model for the spread of me-
dia content in online social networks. This is a complex
system, and naturally it is not appropriate to view our
model as a perfectly accurate mathematical description
of such phenomena. Instead, our model provides a start-
ing point for exploring the mechanisms that contribute to
content spreading dynamics and echo chambers. There
are many worthwhile ways to generalize our model. For
example, our assumption that accounts choose whether
to spread content based on a universal confidence pa-
rameter c is a naive simplification, as is the homogeneity
of non-media accounts in general. Spreading behavior
surely depends on individual characteristics, as has been
explored in models that include zealots [53] and in other
models of social dynamics [24, 54, 55]. Augmenting our
model of content spreading by incorporating account het-
erogeneity is important future work. In such efforts, we
expect that it will be insightful to explore the effects of
structural homophily (for example, as was explored using
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the DeGroot model in [56]). Individuals in social net-
works are free to choose which accounts to follow (and
which accounts to stop following or never follow), and
such choices are sometimes driven by the desire to fol-
low accounts that have similar ideologies [4, 5]. This can
increase structural homophily and exaggerate echo cham-
bers in networks [22, 57], because edges are more likely to
arise (and persist) between nodes with similar ideologies.
There are also other interesting avenues for extending
our work. For example, one can generalize the dynamics
from multiple ideological dimensions by allowing different
weightings of the ideological dimensions. One can also
incorporate spreading through multiple types of social
media by generalizing our model to multilayer networks
[58] or develop models of media influence that go beyond
pairwise interactions by generalizing it to hypergraphs
or simplicial complexes [59]. It will also be interesting
to generalize recent work on bounded-confidence opinion
dynamics that coevolve with network structure [60] to in-
clude the effects of media. It is also important to explore
the influence of time-dependence in network architecture
[61] on the dynamics of our content updating rule, as
accounts can follow new accounts and unfollow accounts
(e.g., using a simplified setting such as network rewiring,
as in adaptive voter models [62]).
A key strength of our model is its flexibility, as one can
formulate generalizations of it (such as ones that we just
discussed) in a straightforward way. Furthermore, one
can already readily use our model to study many inter-
esting phenomena. For example, although we only exam-
ined a few case studies of media probability distributions
in the present paper, one can draw the number of media
accounts, number of followers per account, and ideologies
and quality of media content from any probability distri-
bution — either synthetic ones or ones that are inferred
from empirical data — and it is important to explore
these ideas in future work. It is particularly desirable
for media nodes in a content-spreading model to produce
content that follows some distribution of ideologies and
qualities, rather than always having the same parameter
values for such features. It would also be very interest-
ing to include media nodes with ideologies xM that are
inferred from data, such as through sentiment analysis
on news stories on a given topic (as described in [19] and
references therein). Using procedures such as topic mod-
eling and sentiment analysis can generate a probability
distribution of media accounts in ideological space as an
output, which can then be fed into our model. There has
been some recent progress in this direction. For example,
Ye and Skiena [63] measured media bias and quality from
the web pages and tweets of media sources, and Albanese
et al. [64] created a two-dimensional model based on se-
mantic analysis to quantify media influence on voting.
Another important issue is to examine transient dynam-
ics of content spreading, as it is necessary to go beyond
our focus on the properties of ideological positions in long
times or at convergence.
Developing mathematical approaches for analyzing
and quantifying the dynamics of content spreading has
ramifications for how to mitigate the spread of undesired
content and promote the spread of desired content on-
line. One potential impact is the development of control
strategies and “fake-news filters” (e.g., by flagging con-
tent that is below some threshold value on the quality
axis in a model like ours) that are reminiscent of spam
filters. Our work provides a step toward the development
of novel algorithms to encourage selective spreading of
high-quality or desirable content. Another area for which
further development of such models may also be fruitful
is in bot detection, where most existing algorithms rely
on network measures, followership data, activity rates,
or linguistic cues [7] (all of which are straightforward to
manipulate by malicious actors), rather than directly ex-
ploiting spreading dynamics. Advances in these model-
ing efforts will also yield insights into the theory of on-
line content spreading and help bridge the gap between
simple spreading models and realistic investigations of
spreading on social media.
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(a) Mean convergence time (in color) for different values of nM
and M .
(b) Media impact R versus convergence time.
FIG. 10: In our simulations, we observe an interesting
relationship between media impact and convergence
time. (a) A heat map of the mean convergence time (in
color, where yellow is the longest and blue is the
shortest) versus the number of media accounts (M) on
the vertical axis and the number of followers per media
account (nM ) on the horizontal axis. (b) Mean media
impact R versus the mean convergence time. Each
circle represents one value in the (nM ,M) parameter
plane, so each circle corresponds to one of the square
regions from panel (a). A larger media impact is
positively correlated with a longer time to convergence.
In both panels, we run our simulations on a directed ER
network with N = 100 non-media accounts that follow
an expected mean of k = 25 non-media accounts.
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FIG. 11: An example of a heat map of the media
impact diagnostic R for our model with political
positions with two ideological dimensions. For this
example, we simulate our model on directed ER
networks with N = 100 non-media accounts that follow
an expected mean of k = 25 non-media accounts. We
obtain qualitatively similar results as in our
computations with one ideological dimension, but the
mean media impact is less pronounced in this case.
Specifically, the mean impact R is smaller when using
two ideological dimensions than what we observed
previously when using one ideological dimension for
directed ER networks with the same parameter values.
The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M),
the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media
account (nM ), and the colors represent the media
impact diagnostic (R), which we average over 200 trials.
Dark red indicates the most media impact (i.e., the
largest values of R), and white indicates the least.
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(a) nM = 1 (b) nM = 25 (c) nM = 50 (d) nM = 100
(e) nM = 1 (f) nM = 25 (g) nM = 50 (h) nM = 100
FIG. 12: Impact on the partisan bias of the non-media accounts with media ideologies drawn from a probability
distribution. In the top row [i.e., panels (a)–(d)], we show the media impact for M = 100 media accounts, where we
draw the ideological positions of each media account from the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. We vary the number
nM of followers per media account. In the bottom row [i.e., panels (e)–(h)], we show the media impact for M = 100
media accounts with ideological positions that we draw from a truncated Gaussian distribution on [−1, 1] with mean
0 and standard deviation 0.5. Both sets of simulations are on directed ER networks with N = 100 non-media
accounts. We average each media impact function R(x) over 200 trials. We depict the standard deviations with the
shaded regions. The dashed line at R(x) = 0 represents no media impact. Values of R(x) that lie below this line
indicate that the media has decreased the prevalence of non-media accounts with ideology x in comparison to the
situation in the absence of media; values of R above this line indicate that the media accounts have increased the
prevalence of non-media accounts with ideological position x.
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FIG. 13: Example in which our model that exhibits
multiple time scales in a single simulation of it on Reed
College Facebook network with the same parameter
values (N = 962, c = 0.5, and xM = 0.9) as in Fig. 3. In
this simulation, M = 9 and nM = 225. In the top panel,
we set the convergence tolerance to TOL = 10−4; our
simulation converges with this tolerance after 51 time
steps. In the bottom panel, we show the same network
with the same initial data with the convergence
tolerance set to TOL = 0. For this convergence
tolerance, the two large ideology groups where ideology
is positive eventually “collapse” on a long time scale to
a single ideology group, which is entrained to the media
nodes. This “collapse” takes over 2× 104 time steps to
occur; this is several orders of magnitude longer than
the dynamics in the top panel.
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FIG. 14: We simulate our model on the Reed College Facebook network with the same parameter values (N = 962,
c = 0.5, and xM = 0.9) as in Fig. 3 for 500 trials for three levels of media impact: M = 0 and nM = 0 (yellow),
M = 11 and nM = 225 (orange), and M = 21 and nM = 675 (blue). In the top row, we show the distributions of the
mean of ideology at convergence for convergence tolerances of (left) 0 and (right) 10−4. In the bottom row, we show
the distributions of the variance of the ideology at convergence for a convergence tolerances of (left) 0 and (right)
10−4. Our histograms have 20 bins. We observe that the qualitative behavior of the mean and variance of ideologies
is the same for different tolerances for convergence.
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FIG. 15: We simulate our model for 500 trials, where we draw the network for each trial from a directed ER
random-graph ensemble with N = 100 nodes and an expected mean out-degree of k = 25 (as in Fig. 5). We take
c = 0.5 and xM = 0.9, and we examine three levels of media impact: M = 0 and nM = 0 (yellow), M = 15 and
nM = 15 (orange), and M = 30 and nM = 30 (blue). In the top row, we show the distributions of the mean ideology
at convergence for convergence tolerances of 0 (left) and 10−4 (right). In the bottom row, we show the distributions
of the variance of the ideology at convergence for convergence tolerances of 0 (left) and 10−4 (right). Our histograms
have 20 bins. For both tolerances, we observe that the mean ideology has the same qualitative behavior; the same is
true of the variance of the ideology.
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FIG. 16: Distribution of media accounts in (ideology,
quality) space. We include M = 103 media accounts,
which are hand-curated and available from the Ad
Fontes Media Bias Chart [52]. Each colored dot
represents one media account. The horizontal
coordinate represents the ideological position of an
account’s political content, and the vertical coordinate
represents the quality of its political content. The size
of a dot represents the number of followers of the
associated Twitter account. The five labeled accounts
are the ones that are followed by at least 25% of the
non-media accounts in our numerical experiments.
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FIG. 17: Snapshots of temporal evolution of content ideology and quality in the Reed College network with
M = 103 media accounts over 122 time steps. We draw media ideologies and qualities from Version 4.0 of the Ad
Fontes Media Bias Chart [52]. We choose the number of followers per media account to be proportional to the
approximate number of followers that each media source had on Twitter on 15 February 2019 at 17:36 Pacific
Standard Time (under the constraint that each media source in the model has at least one follower, so we round up
to one follower for some accounts). Each dot in the figure represents a non-media account. The horizontal
coordinate represents the ideological bias of each account’s content at time t, and the vertical coordinate represents
its content quality at time t. To aid visualization, the colors also signify ideological position. (The bluest color is the
most liberal, and the reddest color is the most conservative.) We represent follower relationships as lines between
the dots. This network architecture does not change over time, although the content that is spread by the
non-media accounts does change over time. Because the ideology and quality of the content from the media
accounts does not change, we do not show these nodes.
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FIG. 18: Contour plot of the media impact function
R(x) for ideology and quality in the Reed College
Facebook network with M = 103 media accounts, where
we draw media biases and qualities from Version 4.0 of
the Ad Fontes Media Bias Chart [52] as in Fig. 17. The
impact function R(x) illustrates the relative impact of
the media accounts on the mean ideology and quality of
content in the network. When R < 0 (in blue), the
media has decreased the prevalence of content with the
(ideology, quality) pair (x1,i, x2,i) in comparison to the
content in the absence of media; when R > 0 (in pink),
the media has increased the prevalence of content with
the (ideology, quality) pair (x1,i, x2,i).
